# yaml-language-server: $schema=../../../../schema/control.schema.json id: CB-UBU-NET-007 title: Drop outgoing traffic by default finding: title: The host firewall lets the system open any outgoing connection description: Malware and intruders on the host can reach any server on the Internet to download tools or send data out. status: active profiles: [server-hardened, desktop-hardened] risk: severity: medium assessment: automated tags: [firewall, ufw, nftables, network, egress] description: | Most host firewalls only filter incoming traffic. This control requires the default policy for outgoing packets to drop or reject them, so that the system can only reach the destinations and ports allowed by explicit rules (DNS, NTP, package mirrors, proxies, log collectors...): - with ufw: `deny (outgoing)` or `reject (outgoing)` in `ufw status verbose`; - with nftables (when `nftables.service` is enabled and ufw is not active): a base chain on the `output` hook with `policy drop`; - with iptables-persistent (when `netfilter-persistent.service` is enabled and neither ufw nor nftables is): `OUTPUT` policy `DROP` for iptables and, with IPv6, ip6tables. rationale: | An outgoing allow list stops a compromised service from downloading a second stage, reaching a command and control server or sending data out directly. Blocked attempts also show up in the firewall logs. impact: | Every outgoing flow the system needs must be listed beforehand, including DNS, NTP, package updates and replies handled outside connection tracking. A missing rule breaks updates, time synchronization or name resolution. There is no automatic fix for this reason. audit: manual: | - ufw: `ufw status verbose` shows `deny (outgoing)` or `reject (outgoing)`. - nftables: `nft list ruleset` has a chain with `hook output` and `policy drop`. - iptables-persistent: `iptables -S` and `ip6tables -S` show `-P OUTPUT DROP`. checks: - id: ufw-outgoing engine: shell description: ufw default policy for outgoing traffic. facts: [ufw] spec: script: | ufw status 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^Status: active' || { echo 'ufw is not active'; exit 2; } d=$(ufw status verbose 2>/dev/null | sed -n 's/^Default: //p') echo "$d" printf '%s' "$d" | grep -Eq '(deny|reject) \(outgoing\)' - id: nft-output engine: shell description: nftables output base chain with policy drop. facts: [nftables] spec: script: | [ "$(systemctl is-enabled nftables.service 2>/dev/null)" = enabled ] || { echo 'nftables.service is not enabled'; exit 2; } if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ufw status 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^Status: active'; then echo 'ufw manages the firewall'; exit 2 fi r=$(nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null) || exit 3 if printf '%s\n' "$r" | grep -Eq 'hook output .*policy drop'; then echo 'output: policy drop'; else echo 'output: no chain with policy drop'; exit 1; fi - id: iptables-output engine: shell description: iptables and ip6tables OUTPUT policy with iptables-persistent. spec: script: | [ "$(systemctl is-enabled netfilter-persistent.service 2>/dev/null)" = enabled ] || { echo 'netfilter-persistent.service is not enabled'; exit 2; } if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ufw status 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^Status: active'; then echo 'ufw manages the firewall'; exit 2 fi [ "$(systemctl is-enabled nftables.service 2>/dev/null)" = enabled ] && { echo 'nftables manages the firewall'; exit 2; } PATH="$PATH:/usr/sbin" rc=0 for t in iptables ip6tables; do [ "$t" = ip6tables ] && [ ! -d /proc/sys/net/ipv6 ] && continue r=$($t -S OUTPUT 2>/dev/null) || exit 3 if printf '%s\n' "$r" | grep -Eq '^-P OUTPUT (DROP|REJECT)$'; then echo "$t OUTPUT: DROP"; else echo "$t OUTPUT: not DROP"; rc=1; fi done exit "$rc" remediation: manual: | 1. List the outgoing flows the system needs (`ss -tunp` over a typical day, the configured DNS, NTP and package mirrors, proxies, log and backup servers). 2. Allow them, then change the default: - ufw: `ufw allow out 53`, `ufw allow out 123/udp`, `ufw allow out to port 443 proto tcp`... then `ufw default deny outgoing`; - nftables: add an `output` base chain with `policy drop;`, a rule `ct state established,related accept`, `oif lo accept` and one rule per flow; - iptables-persistent: add the `OUTPUT` rules for each flow, then `iptables -P OUTPUT DROP` (and ip6tables), and `netfilter-persistent save`. 3. Check name resolution, time synchronization and `apt update` right after the change. rollback: | ufw: `ufw default allow outgoing`. nftables: set the output chain policy back to `accept` and reload. iptables: `iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT`, `ip6tables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT`, then `netfilter-persistent save`. references: - title: ufw(8), Ubuntu manual pages url: https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man8/ufw.8.html publisher: Canonical kind: vendor-doc accessed: 2026-10-19 - title: nft(8), Ubuntu manual pages url: https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man8/nft.8.html publisher: Canonical kind: vendor-doc accessed: 2026-10-19 - title: NIST SP 800-41 Rev. 1 - Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy url: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/41/r1/final publisher: NIST kind: guide accessed: 2026-10-19 mappings: - framework: nist-800-53r5 framework_version: "5.1.1" id: SC-7(5) relation: partial - framework: cis-ubuntu-2004 framework_version: "3.0.0" id: "4.2.6" relation: partial note: Ours requires a drop policy for outgoing traffic; CIS 20.04 asks for outbound rules that match the site policy. - framework: cis-ubuntu-2004 framework_version: "3.0.0" id: "4.3.7" relation: partial note: Ours requires a drop policy for outgoing traffic; CIS 20.04 asks for outbound rules that match the site policy. - framework: cis-ubuntu-2004 framework_version: "3.0.0" id: "4.4.2.3" relation: partial note: Ours requires a drop policy for outgoing traffic; CIS 20.04 asks for outbound rules that match the site policy. - framework: cis-ubuntu-2004 framework_version: "3.0.0" id: "4.4.3.3" relation: partial note: Ours requires a drop policy for outgoing traffic; CIS 20.04 asks for outbound rules that match the site policy. - framework: cis-ubuntu-2204 framework_version: "3.0.0" id: "4.1.4" relation: equivalent - framework: cis-ubuntu-2404 framework_version: "2.0.0" id: "4.1.4" relation: equivalent - framework: cis-ubuntu-2604 framework_version: "1.0.0" id: "4.1.4" relation: equivalent threats: - framework: mitre-attack id: T1105 - framework: mitre-attack id: T1041 - framework: cwe id: CWE-284 related_controls: - id: CB-UBU-NET-005 type: requires authors: - name: Alice github: Sn0wAlice verified: - date: 2026-10-19 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["20.04"] environment: Proxmox VM, Ubuntu 20.04 cloud image, kernel 5.4.0-216-generic, BIOS boot notes: "Profile server-hardened; ufw allow outgoing reported, deny outgoing passes with SSH still accepted; nftables output drop and iptables-persistent output policy checks tested." - date: 2026-10-19 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["22.04"] environment: Proxmox VM, Ubuntu 22.04 cloud image, kernel 5.15.0-198-generic, BIOS boot notes: "Profile server-hardened; ufw allow outgoing reported, deny outgoing passes with SSH still accepted." - date: 2026-10-19 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["24.04"] environment: Proxmox VM, Ubuntu 24.04 cloud image, kernel 6.8.0-147-generic, BIOS boot notes: "Profile server-hardened; ufw allow outgoing reported, deny outgoing passes with SSH still accepted." - date: 2026-10-19 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["26.04"] environment: Proxmox VM, Ubuntu 26.04 cloud image, kernel 7.0.0-38-generic, BIOS boot notes: "Profile server-hardened; ufw allow outgoing reported, deny outgoing passes with SSH still accepted; nftables output drop and iptables-persistent output policy checks tested." introduced_in: 0.1.0 created: 2026-10-19 updated: 2026-10-19