# yaml-language-server: $schema=../../../../schema/control.schema.json
id: CB-UBU-DESK-012
title: Allow only known USB devices with USBGuard
finding:
  title: Any USB device plugged into the machine is accepted
  description: A malicious keyboard emulator, network adapter or storage device is enabled as soon as it is plugged in.
status: active
profiles: [desktop-hardened]
risk:
  severity: medium
assessment: automated
tags: [usb, usbguard, device-control]

applicability:
  facts: [usb]

description: |
  USBGuard is a daemon that authorizes each USB device against a rule list
  (`/etc/usbguard/rules.conf`). On first install, the Ubuntu package writes a rule for every
  device present, then starts the daemon. With `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block` (the default),
  devices that match no rule are blocked.
rationale: |
  USB attacks rely on the system trusting whatever is plugged in: a "rubber ducky" types
  commands as a keyboard, a rogue network adapter reroutes traffic, a storage device carries
  malware. An allow list built from the devices the user actually has stops these attacks on
  an unattended or lent machine.
impact: |
  New USB devices (a different keyboard, a docking station, a phone, a USB stick) are blocked
  until an administrator allows them with `usbguard allow-device` and adds a rule with
  `usbguard append-rule` or by regenerating the policy. Devices unplugged at installation time
  are not in the policy: plug in every regular device before applying the fix.
notes: |
  The fix installs the package and enables the service; it is disabled by default because a
  missing rule can block the only keyboard. The check verifies the daemon configuration and
  service, not the content of the rule list: review it with `usbguard list-rules`. The control
  is not applicable when the kernel has no USB support (`/sys/bus/usb` absent, as with some
  minimal virtual machine kernels), since the daemon cannot start there. The package is in the
  universe component (0.7.6 on 20.04, 1.1.x from 22.04): without Ubuntu Pro (esm-apps), its
  security fixes rely on the community (see CB-UBU-PKG-014).

setting:
  location: /etc/usbguard/rules.conf, /etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
  default_value: Not installed
  recommended_value: usbguard installed and active, ImplicitPolicyTarget=block, rules from the present devices

audit:
  manual: |
    1. `dpkg -s usbguard` shows the package installed.
    2. `systemctl is-enabled usbguard` prints `enabled` and `systemctl is-active usbguard` prints
       `active`.
    3. `/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf` sets `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block` and
       `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf` exists.
    4. `usbguard list-rules` lists the expected devices.
  checks:
    - id: package
      engine: package
      description: USBGuard is installed.
      spec:
        name: usbguard
        state: installed
    - id: service
      engine: systemd-unit
      description: The USBGuard daemon starts at boot.
      spec:
        unit: usbguard.service
        state: enabled
    - id: policy
      engine: shell
      description: The daemon runs and blocks devices that match no rule.
      spec:
        script: |
          c=/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf
          [ -f "$c" ] || { echo "$c missing"; exit 1; }
          t=$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*ImplicitPolicyTarget[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*//p' "$c" | tail -n 1)
          r=$(sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*RuleFile[[:space:]]*=[[:space:]]*//p' "$c" | tail -n 1)
          a=$(systemctl is-active usbguard 2>/dev/null)
          n=$(grep -c '^[[:space:]]*[a-z]' "${r:-/nonexistent}" 2>/dev/null)
          echo "ImplicitPolicyTarget=${t:-unset} RuleFile=${r:-unset} rules=${n:-none} service=${a:-unknown}"
          [ "$t" = block ] && [ -n "$r" ] && [ -f "$r" ] && [ "$a" = active ]

remediation:
  manual: |
    1. Plug in every USB device used regularly.
    2. `apt install usbguard`. On first install, the package writes `/etc/usbguard/rules.conf`
       from the devices present and starts the daemon.
    3. Check the rules with `usbguard list-rules`, then `systemctl enable --now usbguard`.
    4. Check that `ImplicitPolicyTarget=block` is set in `/etc/usbguard/usbguard-daemon.conf`.
  effects:
    restart: none
    disruption: high
    lockout_risk: true
  rollback: |
    `systemctl disable --now usbguard` (blocked devices are authorized again when replugged), or
    `apt purge usbguard`.
  scripts:
    - id: package
      from_check: package
    - id: service
      from_check: service

references:
  - title: usbguard-daemon.conf(5), Ubuntu manual pages
    url: https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man5/usbguard-daemon.conf.5.html
    publisher: Canonical
    kind: vendor-doc
    accessed: 2026-10-19
  - title: usbguard-rules.conf(5), Ubuntu manual pages
    url: https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man5/usbguard-rules.conf.5.html
    publisher: Canonical
    kind: vendor-doc
    accessed: 2026-10-19
  - title: usbguard(1), Ubuntu manual pages
    url: https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man1/usbguard.1.html
    publisher: Canonical
    kind: vendor-doc
    accessed: 2026-10-19
  - title: Ubuntu packages - usbguard (noble, universe)
    url: https://packages.ubuntu.com/noble/usbguard
    publisher: Canonical
    kind: vendor-doc
    accessed: 2026-10-19
mappings:
  - framework: nist-800-53r5
    framework_version: "5.1.1"
    id: IA-3
    relation: related
  - framework: nist-800-53r5
    framework_version: "5.1.1"
    id: CM-8(3)
    relation: related
threats:
  - framework: mitre-attack
    id: T1200
  - framework: mitre-attack
    id: T1091
related_controls:
  - id: CB-UBU-DESK-001
    type: related
  - id: CB-UBU-PKG-014
    type: related

authors:
  - name: Alice
    github: Sn0wAlice
verified:
  - date: 2026-10-19
    by: Sn0wAlice
    versions: ["20.04"]
    environment: Proxmox VM with Ubuntu Desktop (GNOME 3.36, gdm3), Ubuntu 20.04.6, kernel 5.4.0-216-generic
    notes: "Generic kernel with a UHCI controller: package installed from universe, policy generated by the package from present devices (root hub and tablet allowed), daemon active, ImplicitPolicyTarget=block; second remediation compliant; state kept after reboot."
  - date: 2026-10-19
    by: Sn0wAlice
    versions: ["22.04"]
    environment: Proxmox VM with Ubuntu Desktop (GNOME 42, gdm3), Ubuntu 22.04.5, kernel 5.15.0-198-generic
    notes: "Generic kernel with a UHCI controller: package installed from universe, policy generated by the package from present devices (root hub and tablet allowed), daemon active, ImplicitPolicyTarget=block; second remediation compliant; state kept after reboot."
  - date: 2026-10-19
    by: Sn0wAlice
    versions: ["24.04"]
    environment: Proxmox VM with Ubuntu Desktop (GNOME 46, gdm3), Ubuntu 24.04.5, kernel 6.8.0-147-generic
    notes: "Generic kernel with a UHCI controller: package installed from universe, policy generated by the package from present devices (root hub and tablet allowed), daemon active, ImplicitPolicyTarget=block; second remediation compliant; state kept after reboot."
  - date: 2026-10-19
    by: Sn0wAlice
    versions: ["26.04"]
    environment: Proxmox VM with Ubuntu Desktop (GNOME 50, gdm3), Ubuntu 26.04.1, kernel 7.0.0-38-generic
    notes: "Generic kernel with a UHCI controller: package installed from universe, policy generated by the package from present devices (root hub and tablet allowed), daemon active, ImplicitPolicyTarget=block; second remediation compliant; state kept after reboot."
introduced_in: 0.1.0
created: 2026-10-19
updated: 2026-10-19