# yaml-language-server: $schema=../../../../schema/control.schema.json id: CB-M365-DEVICE-007 title: Enable Windows LAPS backup to Microsoft Entra ID finding: title: Windows LAPS is not enabled in Microsoft Entra ID description: Local administrator passwords of Entra-joined Windows devices cannot be backed up to Entra ID, so they are likely shared, static or unmanaged. status: active profiles: [baseline] risk: severity: high assessment: manual tags: [entra-id, laps, local-admin, credentials, lateral-movement] description: | The device setting **Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)** is set to **Yes**, and a client-side Windows LAPS policy (Intune **Endpoint security** > **Account protection** > **Local admin password solution (Windows LAPS)**, or Group Policy for hybrid devices) backs up the password of the managed local administrator account to Microsoft Entra ID and rotates it. The tenant setting alone does nothing: it allows devices to store passwords in Entra ID. The client policy decides which account is managed, the backup directory, password complexity, length and age. rationale: | A local administrator account with the same password on every device lets an attacker who compromises one endpoint reuse the hash or password on all others (pass-the-hash, lateral movement). Windows LAPS gives every device a unique random password, rotates it, and records every retrieval in the Entra audit log. impact: | None for users. Helpdesk staff retrieve the password from the device page in Entra ID or Intune instead of a shared value; grant only them the right to read LAPS passwords (Cloud Device Administrator, or a custom role with `microsoft.directory/deviceLocalCredentials/password/read`). Requires Windows 10 or 11 (April 2023 update or later) or Windows Server 2019/2022; Entra registered devices are not supported. When a device object is deleted, its stored password is lost. setting: location: Microsoft Entra admin center > Entra ID > Devices > Device settings > Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) default_value: "No" recommended_value: "Yes, plus a Windows LAPS client policy backing up to Microsoft Entra ID" audit: manual: | 1. Sign in to the Microsoft Entra admin center (https://entra.microsoft.com) as at least a Global Reader. 2. Browse to **Entra ID** > **Devices** > **Device settings** and check that **Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)** is **Yes**. 3. Browse to **Entra ID** > **Devices** > **Overview** > **Local administrator password recovery** and check that Windows devices are listed with a recent rotation date (metadata readable by Security Reader). 4. In the Intune admin center, browse to **Endpoint security** > **Account protection** and check that a **Local admin password solution (Windows LAPS)** policy with **Backup Directory** set to Microsoft Entra ID is assigned to all Windows devices. 5. Alternative, read only: `Invoke-MgGraphRequest -Method GET -Uri https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy` and read `localAdminPassword.isEnabled`; `GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/directory/deviceLocalCredentials` (scope `DeviceLocalCredential.ReadBasic.All`) lists devices with a backed-up password. 6. Fail if the tenant setting is **No**, or if no client policy backs up passwords for the Windows fleet. remediation: manual: | 1. Browse to **Entra ID** > **Devices** > **Device settings**, set **Enable Microsoft Entra Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)** to **Yes** and save. Role: Cloud Device Administrator. 2. In the Intune admin center, browse to **Endpoint security** > **Account protection** > **Create Policy**, platform **Windows**, profile **Local admin password solution (Windows LAPS)**. Set **Backup Directory** to **Backup the password to Microsoft Entra ID only**, a password age of 30 days or less, and complexity with at least 14 characters. Assign it to a pilot group, then to all Windows devices. Role: Intune Administrator or Endpoint Security Manager. 3. Graph equivalent for the tenant setting: `PUT https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/policies/deviceRegistrationPolicy` with `localAdminPassword.isEnabled` set to `true`. 4. Protect password recovery: require phishing-resistant MFA for the roles allowed to read LAPS passwords. rollback: | Unassign the Intune LAPS policy, then set the tenant setting back to **No**. Passwords already rotated stay valid until changed: recover them before rollback. references: - title: Use Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) with Microsoft Entra ID url: https://learn.microsoft.com/entra/identity/devices/howto-manage-local-admin-passwords publisher: Microsoft kind: vendor-doc accessed: 2026-10-24 - title: Maester test MT.1177 url: https://maester.dev/docs/tests/MT.1177 publisher: Maester kind: tool accessed: 2026-10-24 mappings: - framework: cis-m365 framework_version: "7.0.0" id: "5.1.4.5" relation: stricter note: Also requires the client-side Windows LAPS policy that actually backs up and rotates passwords. - framework: nist-800-53r5 framework_version: "5.1.1" id: IA-5 relation: related - framework: nist-800-53r5 framework_version: "5.1.1" id: AC-2 relation: related threats: - framework: mitre-attack id: T1550.002 - framework: mitre-attack id: T1078.003 related_controls: - id: CB-M365-DEVICE-005 type: related - id: CB-M365-DEVICE-006 type: related - id: CB-M365-DEVICE-008 type: related - id: CB-M365-AUTH-004 type: related authors: - name: Alice github: Sn0wAlice introduced_in: 0.1.0 created: 2026-10-24 updated: 2026-10-24