# yaml-language-server: $schema=../../../../schema/control.schema.json id: CB-DEB-SVC-012 title: Only approved services listen on network interfaces finding: title: Services nobody approved accept connections from the network description: Every listening socket is an entry point; unknown ones are neither patched nor monitored. status: active profiles: [core] risk: severity: medium assessment: partial tags: [services, network, attack-surface] description: | Each TCP or UDP socket listening on a non-loopback address must belong to a service the system is meant to provide, and listen only on the interfaces where that service is needed. rationale: | The services an attacker can reach from the network define the remote attack surface. Services that listen by default (LLMNR in systemd-resolved, development servers, agents) are easy to forget and widen it without anyone noticing. impact: | Stopping or rebinding a service makes it unreachable for remote clients; check with its owner first. notes: | The check lists the listening sockets outside loopback as `protocol/port process` and always passes, so the control ends as `review`: a person must compare the list with the services approved for the system role. On a fresh Debian cloud image the list holds `sshd` (tcp/22), the DHCP client of `systemd-networkd` (udp/68) and LLMNR in `systemd-resolved` (tcp and udp/5355). audit: manual: | 1. Run `ss -Hltunp` as root. 2. For each socket not bound to `127.0.0.0/8` or `::1`, check that the process is an approved service for this system and that it listens only on the needed addresses. checks: - id: listeners engine: shell description: Lists sockets listening outside loopback, for review. spec: script: | command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "ss not found"; exit 3; } ss -Hltunp 2>/dev/null | awk '{ addr = $5 if (addr ~ /^(127\.|\[::1\]|\[::ffff:127\.)/) next port = addr; sub(/.*:/, "", port) proc = $7; sub(/^users:\(\("/, "", proc); sub(/".*/, "", proc) print $1 "/" port " " (proc == "" ? "?" : proc) }' | sort -u | tr '\n' ' ' echo remediation: manual: | For each socket that is not approved: stop and mask the service (`systemctl mask --now `) or remove its package. For an approved service that listens too widely, bind it to the needed address in its configuration, and filter the port with the host firewall. references: - title: ss(8), Debian manual pages url: https://manpages.debian.org/trixie/iproute2/ss.8.en.html publisher: Debian kind: vendor-doc accessed: 2026-10-18 - title: ANSSI-BP-028 v2.0 - Recommandations de configuration d'un système GNU/Linux (R80) url: https://messervices.cyber.gouv.fr/documents-guides/fr_np_linux_configuration-v2.0.pdf publisher: ANSSI kind: guide accessed: 2026-10-18 mappings: - framework: anssi-linux framework_version: "2.0" id: R80 relation: equivalent - framework: nist-800-53r5 framework_version: "5.1.1" id: CM-7(1) relation: related - framework: cis-debian-12 framework_version: "2.0.0" id: "2.1.4" relation: equivalent - framework: cis-debian-13 framework_version: "1.1.0" id: "2.1.23" relation: equivalent threats: - framework: mitre-attack id: T1046 - framework: mitre-attack id: T1210 authors: - name: Alice github: Sn0wAlice verified: - date: 2026-10-18 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["12"] environment: Proxmox VM, Debian 12 genericcloud image, kernel 6.1.0-54-cloud-amd64 notes: "Check lists non-loopback listeners and ends as review, on fresh and loaded systems, before and after reboot." - date: 2026-10-18 by: Sn0wAlice versions: ["13"] environment: Proxmox VM, Debian 13 genericcloud image, kernel 6.12.113+deb13-cloud-amd64 notes: "Check lists non-loopback listeners and ends as review, on fresh and loaded systems, before and after reboot." introduced_in: 0.1.0 created: 2026-10-18 updated: 2026-10-18